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Abstract
Background: In recent years, much attention has been given to the spread of influenza around the world. With 
the continuing human outbreak of H5N1 beginning in 2003 and the H1N1 pandemic in 2009, focus on influenza 
and other respiratory viruses has been increased. It has been accepted for decades that international travel via jet 
aircraft is a major vector for global spread of influenza, and epidemiological differences between tropical and 
temperate regions observed. Thus we wanted to study how indoor environmental conditions (enclosed locations) 
in the tropics and winter temperate zones contribute to the aerosol spread of influenza by travelers. To this end, a 
survey consisting of 632 readings of temperature (T) versus relative humidity (RH) in 389 different enclosed 
locations air travelers are likely to visit in 8 tropical nations were compared to 102 such readings in 2 Australian 
cities, including ground transport, hotels, shops, offices and other publicly accessible locations, along with 586 
time course readings from aircraft.
Results: An influenza transmission risk contour map was developed for T versus RH. Empirical equations were 
created for estimating: 1. risk relative to temperature and RH, and 2. time parameterized influenza transmission 
risk. Using the transmission risk contours and equations, transmission risk for each country's locations was 
compared with influenza reports from the countries. Higher risk enclosed locations in the tropics included new 
automobile transport, luxury buses, luxury hotels, and bank branches. Most temperate locations were high risk.
Conclusion: Environmental control is recommended for public health mitigation focused on higher risk enclosed 
locations. Public health can make use of the methods developed to track potential vulnerability to aerosol 
influenza. The methods presented can also be used in influenza modeling. Accounting for differential aerosol 
transmission using T and RH can potentially explain anomalies of influenza epidemiology in addition to 
seasonality in temperate climates.
Background
The contrasting epidemiology of influenza in the tropics
versus temperate regions has been discussed for many
years, and it has been accepted for decades that jet air-
craft are a major vector for global spread of influenza[1].
T h i s  s t u d y  i s  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d  a e r o s o l
influenza transmission for indoor locations by examining
temperature and humidity indoors where jet travelers are
likely to interact with locals and comparing humid tropi-
cal locations with temperate winter ones. In recent years,
much attention has been given to the spread of influenza
around the world, especially with the continuing H5N1
outbreaks since 2003 and the H1N1 pandemic in 2009.
Extensive research has been conducted to understand the
mechanism of transmission of influenza virus, including
environmental conditions that favor transmission. Vari-
ous aerosol studies have shown that micron range droplet
particles from breathing, talking, coughing and sneezing
bear influenza viruses, and that the aerosol route is an
important contributor to infection[2,3]. The particles
making up aerosol in normal exhalation are less than 1
micron in size; aerosol particles range from 0.1 micron to
5 micron[2,4], and these smallest particles are primary
vectors of contagion[5,6].
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Questions have been raised as to whether or not aero-
sol transmission of influenza occurs or is a significant
contributor to its epidemiology, and whether vitamin D is
a determining factor[7-10]. We believe that our study
sheds helpful light on these matters by defining a frame-
work that starts to formalize the effect of temperature
and RH conditions on such transmission. We treat this
more extensively in the discussion section.
We intend this study to be primarily targeted at public
health planners and epidemic model developers. Inter-
ventions to successfully interrupt spread of influenza that
have been studied in depth are quarantine, isolation, dif-
ferent types of masks, gloves, hygiene, and combinations
of these[11]. Public health planners can use our results to
consider making climate control adjustment recommen-
dations, which can help control aerosol transmission. As
well, modeling of epidemics in software depends on
assumptions about where contagion is likely to occur.
Some types of modeling today may take into account gen-
eralized types of mixing locations which are
enclosed[12,13], as it is believed that most transmission
(including aerosol) occurs indoors, with much attention
put on social network[14,15]. We believe that such mod-
els can be improved by modeling of interior temperature
and RH.
The authors developed a contour map of T versus RH
based on literature from Lowen et al.[16-18] and others.
In the studies of Lowen et al. guinea pigs were exposed to
aerosol infection from another guinea pig for 7 days in an
environmental cabinet maintaining temperature and rela-
tive humidity at varying levels. Thus, where we refer to a
25% risk of transmission, or a 25% contour, we mean that
the risk of aerosol infection of one guinea pig over 7 days
of continuous aerosol exposure to an infected guinea pig
is roughly 25% (25%G7). W e use this animal model as a
baseline for estimation of differential risk to human pop-
ulations. It is understood that temperature and humidity
are not the only factors in aerosol transmission; however,
we believe that they are primary factors along with dilu-
tion by air exchange and distribution by air cur-
rents[2,19]. In modern building systems, recirculation of
indoor air for energy efficiency is also a likely factor. We
collected data in 8 countries in the tropics and 2 Austra-
lian cities during winter (June-September 2009). Relative
humidity and temperature readings were taken in public
areas frequented by travelers (e.g. hotels, banks, malls,
shops, taxis, buses, etc.) as well as during flights between
nations. Observations were also recorded of behaviors
that could augment the spread of influenza significantly.
Interviews were conducted in major cities in the tropics
and Australia to improve understanding of influenza
transmission conditions.
In the process of our study, observations were made
that suggest inexpensive measures that could be taken to
minimize the spread of influenza in the tropics via aero-
sol, and these may also apply to temperate regions.
Methods
Instruments and readings
A model EP8706 digital psychrometer (Mannix Testing &
Measurement, Lynbrook, New York) was used to take
readings of temperature and humidity for most of the
data. For a subset of the Singapore data, a Holmes analog
humidity meter was used with a conventional analog dry
bulb thermometer. These instruments were calibrated
against each other, and the digital psychrometer was
assumed to be the more accurate instrument. Correction
was applied to the Holmes humidity data based on cross-
calibration. Each reading is a one-time measurement;
instruments came to equilibrium before a reading was
recorded by hand with the time, date and location. Care
was taken to ensure instrument temperature was at ambi-
ent, shielded from strong air currents and major infrared
radiant sources to prevent condensation or improper
evaporation from the probe.
Locations surveyed
During the months of July through September 2009,
major cities in the countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Thailand, Singapore and New
Guinea were surveyed as representative of the humid
tropical belt. Australia was chosen as the location of cities
experiencing temperate winter conditions and a signifi-
cant spike in H1N1 influenza. The cities (which included
nearby suburban areas) were: San Jose, Costa Rica; Lima,
Peru; Panama City, Panama; San Salvador, El Salvador;
Managua, Nicaragua; Bangkok, Thailand; Singapore; Port
Moresby, Papua New Guinea; Sydney and Melbourne,
Australia. Some surveillance of outlying areas was also
performed.
Travel locations typical of choices made by tourists and
business travelers was performed, as well as a survey of
shops, offices, malls, high end hotels, and dining estab-
lishments in each city. These locations were chosen
because in the modern world, epidemics are spread rap-
idly by aircraft[1] and thus by extension, the places visited
by those who travel on aircraft (tourists and businesspeo-
ple) are the logical contact points with the population of
those nations.
Environment in buses, tour cars, and taxicabs was also
monitored, and, where feasible, time courses were con-
ducted on transportation. These data could be improved
on by a more comprehensive data collection conducted in
more countries over the course of several years at a larger
number of locations. However, the data is sufficient to be
useful, and care was taken to make choices as consistent
with tourist and business behavior typical of air travelersHanley and Borup Virology Journal 2010, 7:98
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as possible and to only observe, never direct or interfere
with environmental controls or human behavior.
Contagion estimation contour development
After review, aerosol transmission estimations were pri-
marily drawn from Lowen et al. to interpolate contours of
transmission of influenza in the humidity versus temper-
ature phase space. A set of contours was generated that is
believed to be mildly conservative (Figure 1 and Addi-
tional file 1 - Contagion contour estimation details).
The emphasized 25% transmission line corresponds to a
rough 25% transmission probability in the Lowen et al.
guinea pig studies, which were done with continuous
exposure for 7 days with animals housed near each other
on a shelf (25%G7). This line was used as the cutoff when
counting locations inside and outside of optimum aerosol
transmission conditions. Similarly, other contours can be
referred to with the G7 subscript to clarify what is being
discussed, (e.g. 10%G7, 50%G7, 100%G7, etc.)
Equation 1 is a polynomial equation fitted for the 25%G7
contour using Maple 10[20] (Maplesoft, Waterloo,
Ontario, Canada) and entered into Excel 2003 (Microsoft,
Redmond, Washington). This equation was used to create
the distance values for other figures. Due to the length
and technicality, equation 1 is only shown in the addi-
tional files. (Additional file 1- Contagion contour esti-
mation details, Equation 1: 25%G7  risk contour
temperature.) A sample equation formatted for spread-
sheet use (Additional file 2 - Empirical 25% line equa-
tion in text format for use in Excel) is supplied in text
form along with the Maple 10 file used to generate it
(Additional file 3 - Maple workbook for 25% line equa-
tion). Note the equation fit is meaningless below 20% RH
or above 80% RH.
Figure 1 Aerosol influenza transmission risk contours. For the purposes of estimating risk of transmission of influenza by aerosol over 7 days, data 
points consisting of relative humidity and temperature in degrees C can be plotted on this contour map of the risk of transmission. (See Discussion, 
Development of contagion contours.) The risk of transmission over 7 days is the percentage value called out for each contour line. The 25%G7 trans-
mission risk contour is emphasized (bold) as a boundary for risk of contagion. The 25%G7 contour was chosen based on calculating estimates of R (re-
productive) values for various locations based on crude risk of aerosol transmission as derived from Equation 2, Contagion probability estimate by 
time expressed in days. (See also Discussion, 25%G7 transmission risk contour selection.)
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Morbidity and mortality data
We recognize that accurate influenza morbidity and mor-
tality data are notoriously difficult to acquire[21,22].
Mortality and morbidity rates based on current surveil-
lance data were collected both from official reports
(WHO PAHO/SEARO, Departments of Public Health)
and directly from responsible public health personnel in
interviews. Care was taken to try to minimize artifact dif-
ferences due to surveillance deficits. Alternate sources
such as Flutracker[23] were consulted to vet surveillance
data and we believe our data is as accurate as obtainable
for the period.
Crude risk calculation
Crude risk derivation is based on a histogram of the esti-
mated time of contagion for the animals in Lowen et al.,
as presented in Figure 2. Calculated crude risk estimates
are given in tables where time in location estimation
allows it.
A polynomial equation (equation 2, Additional file 1-
Contagion contour estimation details) was fitted to the
histogram data using Maple 10[20] to estimate the risk of
start of infection over the days in which secondary infec-
tions are estimated to have occurred. This 4th degree
equation from day 1 to 9 was selected to fit observations
and knowledge that virus shedding from inoculated ani-
mals is expected to end by day 8. To express probability of
infection, the histogram values were represented as frac-
tions of the total number of infections, and the equation
fitted so the area under the curve is equal to 1 to 3 deci-
mal places. Tables 1 and 2 contain estimates generated
from this equation. (See also: Additional file 4 - Maple
workbook for empirical contagion probability equa-
tion, and Additional file 5 - Empirical contagion proba-
bility integral in text format for use in Excel.)
Equation 2: Contagion probability estimate by time
expressed in days
Where t =time expressed in days, p is crude risk proba-
bility assuming 100% 7 day contagion (100%G7) C(T, RH)
is the estimated risk for a field reading from the contour
map and pc = probability of contagion. Result p when mul-
tiplied by contagion contour percentage at a temperature
and RH provides the time scaled risk of infection in a loca-
tion (pc). See Additional file 1- Contagion contour esti-
mation details for more discussion.
Results
The aerosol transmission contours are presented in Fig-
ure 3 with all data plotted by nation. Temperature dimen-
sion distances from the 25%G7 transmission line for all
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Figure 2 The contagion curve is the plot of an equation fitted to the contagion histogram  using Maple 10. (See equation 2, Contagion probability 
estimate by time expressed in  days and Additional file 1 - Contagion contour estimation details, Equation 2.) The  zero for the contagion curve 
is adjusted to reflect the probable day of contagion, rather  than when viral loads appear. The contagion equation provides a conservative  continuous 
probability of the infection of one individual exposed to infection by aerosol  versus time expressed in days.  Hanley and Borup Virology Journal 2010, 7:98
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Figure 3 Relative humidity versus temperature for all data. In these scatterplots the difference between tropical nations (3A, N = 766) and Aus-
tralia's temperate cities in southern hemisphere winter (3B, N = 110) can be seen on a contour map of risk of transmission by aerosol. The contour lines 
are based on aerosol transmission time course experiments over 7 days by Lowen et al. together with support from other literature. Thus, the 25%G7 
transmission line indicates that over 7 days under similar controlled conditions 25% of hosts exposed by aerosol would become ill. (See equation 2, 
Contagion probability estimate by time expressed in days for how to calculate risk based on time in location.) For general purposes of evaluating 
risk, the distance of points below the chosen transmission line can be visually evaluated by inspection. In these graphs, datapoints consist of temper-
ature and RH for: Bank Branch, Club, Casino, Church, College, Dining, Dwellings, Elevator, Entertainment, Gym, Hospital, Hotel, Mall, Office, Pharmacy, 
Public site, Retail, Terminal, and Transport, for all nations. To see cumulative distribution data showing distance from the 25%G7 transmission risk con-
tour line for these data, refer to Figure 4.
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Figure 4 Temperature distance from 25%G7 transmission risk contour. The 4A ogive (cumulative distribution curve for the histogram) for each 
nation was plotted with a vertical line at the zero point. For Figure 4A bins of 2 degrees C width are used to categorize temperature distances from 
the 25%G7 transmission risk contour. Figure 4B presents the same temperature distance data in a linear density plot for each nation, with a tick mark 
for each temperature distance, and the arithmetic mean. The temperature distances were calculated for each point shown in Figure 3 using a Maple 
generated 25%G7 transmission risk contour line equation. (See equation 1, and Additional file 1- Contagion contour estimation details for equation 
and details of use.) For both figures, the zero point of these graphs is the 25%G7 transmission risk contour line.
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Figure 5 Case and mortality reports versus average distance from 25%G7 transmission risk contour. These figures show the relationship be-
tween the average temperature distances as shown in Figure 4, and influenza case reports per 10,000 (5A) or influenza case mortality per million (5B). 
Case and mortality figures are up to September, 2009.
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Figure 6 Closed, Air Conditioned Tropical Ground Transport. The scatter plot (6A) and linear density plot (6B) show all data (multiple time course 
readings per trip) for motor vehicles categorized by old and new. The vehicle data shown above is for vehicles with closed windows and air condi-
tioning. All old taxi, tour and hotel car readings show low risk (above the 25%G7 transmission risk line). Most readings for new cars in this low risk region 
are due to higher temperature and low humidity, presumably because automotive engineers are using evaporative cooling from the skin of passen-
gers in dehumidified air to lower perceived temperature.
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data points produced the cumulative histogram of tem-
perature distances ogive/density charts of Figure 4. This
shows the relationship of readings to the 25%G7 risk con-
tour for the entire dataset. Figure 5 shows correlation of
average distance from the 25%G7 contour to cases of influ-
enza. We will now examine in more detail different types
of locations surveyed.
Buses and taxis
Luxury buses are used for long-distance trips of 4-12
hours, have air conditioning (AC) and windows operable
only in emergency. A not uncommon complaint is that
these buses are too cold. They are commonly used by
traveling visitors, and also by middle class inhabitants of
the region desiring more comfort in their travel. Luxury
bus trips (N = 16) fell into the region of concern below
the 25%G7 transmission risk contour (Figure 6), and pas-
sengers shedding virus are a probable source of aerosol.
Additionally, vendors often appear at stops selling mer-
chandise. Some vendors get on at one stop and travel with
the bus for 45 minutes or so, selling products and enter-
taining the passengers. Others get on the bus at stops and
spend shorter periods of time on the order of 10 minutes,
getting off one stop later. Some get on and off at the same
stop in 2-4 minutes. Total estimated vendor time inside
buses is on the order of 3-5 hours per day over as many as
20 buses, each bus containing potential influenza aerosol,
raising their chances of both infection and transmission.
Wake effects such as those proposed to explain SARS
transmission in a modern jet aircraft[24] are generated by
them, and they lean in close to many passengers. Addi-
tionally, they have physical contact through money and
product exchange, which is usually food.
I n e x p e n s i v e  b u s e s  u s e d  b y  l o c a l s  h a v e  n o  A C,  u s i n g
open windows for ventilation. Readings confirmed that
their temperatures and RH are equal to or higher than
ambient temperatures (data not shown). Vendors serving
these inexpensive buses were fewer, and were only
observed to board briefly at stops, departing the bus
within 2-3 minutes, or to make sales directly through
windows.
Trips in high end taxicabs and new minivan shuttles (N
= 21) also showed good transmission conditions (Figure
6). Trips in old taxis (N = 11), even if closed and air-con-
ditioned, and those not using recirculation, stayed out of
the high risk region. The ability of a new automobile to
rapidly lower humidity with the windows closed on recir-
culation setting to between 45% and 25% RH within 5
minutes or less is remarkable (Figure 7). New high end
taxis and hotel cars were commonly occupied by travelers
for 20-45 minutes (to/from airports, to/from holiday or
business meetings).
Non-residential buildings
Of high end tropical hotels studied (N = 22) approxi-
mately 50% had good conditions for aerosol transmission
i n  c o m m o n  a r e a s .  H o w e v e r ,  a l l  t r o p i c a l  h o t e l s  h a v i n g
good conditions were in the high RH region near 65%
(data not shown).
Tropical locations to find good conditions for aerosol
influenza transmission to the general public were bank
branches, dining facilities, retail shops and offices (Figure
8). The overall impression was that business locations in
the tropics needing to appear high-status set their AC
systems to generate low humidity and temperature.
In the temperate Australian winter, 98% of buildings (N
= 100) showed good aerosol transmission conditions
(Figure 3B). Thus, no breakdown by type of facility is pre-
sented.
Dwellings
Dwellings were not surveyed in all nations and the sam-
ple was low; however, where surveyed, estimates were
made of how typical RH and temperature were for a
dwelling class. The majority of tropical apartment build-
ings (N = 10, data not shown) had open-air common
areas and showed poor aerosol conditions. Surprisingly,
temperature and RH conditions in dwellings surveyed
were not optimum for transmission in Australia, although
the sample was insufficiently large.
Airplane flights
Using our transmission contours, conditions for influ-
enza transmission exist during deplaning (Figure 9) for
intervals of 7 minutes or less from the time passengers
Figure 7 Relative humidity time course for new tropical automo-
biles. In this figure are shown automobile trips of 5 minutes or more in 
closed vehicles with air conditioning. It can be seen that within 5 min-
utes, relative humidity is lowered to between 45% and 25%. Time 0:00 
is street ambient temperature and the first interior reading is at or after 
1 minute. The humidity in a new automobile was significantly lower 
than the street humidity at the time of the first reading after the door 
was closed. That these vehicles recirculated their air would be expect-
ed to contribute to contagion. N = 15.
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Figure 8 Tropical buildings distance (in temperature) from 25%G7 transmission risk contour. In this figure, outdoor conditions (street ambient 
values) contrast with conditions inside of buildings. 20% or more of the bank branch, office, retail, hotel and dining locations displayed good aerosol 
transmission conditions (i.e. below the 25%G7 transmission line) with sample size > 20. Temperature and RH of terminals (for aircraft and buses), hall-
ways in shopping malls, and hospitals, was considered indicative and thus shown, though having smaller sample sizes than desired. Although there 
were only 8 different hospitals surveyed in tropical nations, hospital data was included because hospitals receive ill patients, and many of these nations 
have only one major facility. These data suggest that hospitals have a relatively high investment in HVAC in the tropics, on the order of retail and high 
end hotels, presumably for comfort of patients.
Black and dark gray pie charts are shown for datasets with N greater than 20. Datasets with less than 20 measurements in the sample are shown with 
light gray and white to emphasize the difference in sample size.
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stood up until aircraft cleared (mean 3 min 55 sec, N =
12). During this time, ventilation was often turned to a
low setting or off. The authors believe risk is probably low
on a per passenger basis, because the period is limited to
the short time in which passengers file out of the airplane
and other factors may override T and RH. Aircraft data
(Figure 10) is otherwise presented without risk interpre-
tation (see discussion).
Discussion
Development of contagion contours
Literature shows opposing conditions for transmission of
viruses in general; low relative humidity (RH) and high
RH[5,25,26] with temperature a secondary factor. Theory
predicts osmotic forces should affect enveloped viruses
such as influenza, while icosahedral viruses (e.g. polio,
norovirus) would not be so sensitive for structural rea-
sons. Enveloped viruses generally have highest infective
stability at RH somewhat below 50%[5], and non-envel-
oped icosahedral viruses usually show greatest infective
stability in aerosol in high humidity conditions[25,26].
Data of Lowen et al.[16,17] at 20°C show optimal trans-
mission of influenza by aerosol at a first RH range from
20-40%, and at a second from 60-70%. Lower tempera-
tures improve transmission, with temperatures above
30°C reducing transmission to zero. These data correlate
with other in-vitro studies[5,25-27].
Influenza is an enveloped virus. Enveloped viruses bud
from the cell membrane, so the virus envelope is host cell
(or golgi) membrane acquired in the budding process.
Inside the envelope is RNA, a few enzymes and proteins,
along with cell cytosol at physiological salt concentration.
This matters because if one puts a cell in an environment
containing lower salt concentration than in cytosol, the
cell membrane acts as an osmosis membrane and eventu-
ally ruptures[28]. Enveloped viruses will have the same
issue, although the smaller diameter should give greater
stability to rupture per equation 3.
Equation 3:
Where F = membrane tensile force, P = pressure, r = radius
Infectious droplets from the lungs start out with physi-
ological levels of salts. These salts could cause rupture of
virion envelopes as droplets collect distilled water from
humid air. Schaffer et al[27] studied stability of enveloped
viruses from different cell lines (viz. kidney, chick
embryo) and these cell lines buffer osmotic pressures at
different rates[28]. Those results indicate that cells which
are better at buffering themselves to osmotic pressure
produce enveloped viruses that survive longer at higher
F
Pr
=
2
Figure 9 Deplane period. This figure shows average temperature and relative humidity from the time the first passenger stands up in each aircraft 
until completion of deplaning for all datapoints in the time courses. Aircraft N = 15.
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RH. We are not aware of any direct study of osmotic
destruction of enveloped virions, although it makes con-
siderable sense.
At lower RH, enveloped viruses are quite stable and
infectious; at high RH they are not. One possibility is the
above-mentioned osmotic pressure issue. Another is the
theory that droplet particles settle more quickly as they
take on water[17] under high RH, which fits Stokes'
law[2]. In addition, enlargement of the particle as a con-
densation nucleus will cause it not to penetrate as far into
lungs as a result[2]. However, none of these hypotheses
explain the viability trough at 50% RH nor the secondary
peak at 65% RH, although the rapid decline toward 80%
RH does fit. The primary variable between in-vitro stud-
ies and Lowen et al. appears to be differences between the
synthetic droplet media of the in-vitro studies[25,27] and
the natural droplets from exhalation, which are likely to
be glycoproteins, salts and other components of
mucus[29].
A study by Harper[25] examined, in-vitro, survival of 4
cultured viruses in aerosol, at temperatures ranging from
21°C to 24°C. To the degree his results differ from Lowen
in the 50% + humidity range, they might be explained by
his higher temperature. If so, that would change the con-
tours of influenza transmission risk (Figure 1) somewhat,
although the current transmission risk contours would
remain conservative. Alternatively, this difference may be
from the droplet fluid carrying virus used by Harper, as
mentioned above.
There is an argument that influenza strains might vary
in stability from mutations sufficiently to affect the con-
tours of transmission as taken from Lowen. However,
evolutionary argument supports virus stability in aerosol
as strongly conserved, since in humans, viruses with
lesser aerosol stability will not propagate as well as those
with greater stability (unless aerosol stability is compen-
sated for by some other propagation enhancement), and
viruses with optimum stability will be selected for during
host to host transmission[30,31]. Thus, literature results
from human influenza virus strains would be expected to
be from virus near the practical limit of aerosol stability.
Further, osmotic pressure generates tensile force on the
envelope, which will exhibit resistance to osmotic pres-
sure not exceeding the weakest envelope bilayer hydrogen
bonds.
Based on the considerations above, contours were gen-
erated based on linear interpolation of Lowen et
al.[16,17] cross-validated with others[5,25,27,32]. These
c o n t o u r s  a p p l y  t o  R H  c o n d i t i o n s  f r o m  2 0 %  t o  8 0 % ,
a lt h o u gh  i t  i s  li k e ly  t h a t  c o n t o u rs  a bo v e  8 0 %  RH  h a v e
lower transmission risk than at 80%. Both the region from
0% to 20% RH and that above 80% RH are less clear and
need investigation. The justification for using these risk
contours in larger scale environments is based on data
from studies that show long term persistence (hours) of
viable aerosol virus[25,27].
Statistical validity of the contour graph
As presented by Lowen et al.[16,17] in studies of aerosol
transmission of influenza over 7 days, there are three
temperature groups, 5°C, 20°C and 30°C at varying RH.
For the 5°C temperature there are four RH categories,
35%, 50%, 65% and 80%. At 20°C and 30°C there is an
additional fifth at 20% RH. At 30°C there is no transmis-
sion. At 5°C transmission varies from 100% to 50% and at
20°C from 100% to 0%. Thus, where statistical power is in
question is between 5°C and 20°C. As discussed[17], the
difference in transmissibility between 5°C and 20°C at
50% and 80% humidity is significant (p  < 0.05). This
leaves the 65% relative humidity results at 20°C to be
examined.
To further evaluate the Lowen data, we considered it in
the context of Harper[25] and Schaffer[27] data on time
course viability of influenza virions at differing tempera-
ture and humidity, because it is axiomatic that the longer
virions can remain viable in aerosol, the more likely they
are to cause infection by this route. Harper shows sup-
port for the transmission decline of Lowen, as viability
declines when RH increases toward 50%. Schaffer data for
one hour survival at 21°C (see figure two of Schaffer et al.)
also shows a viability trough at 50% RH rising at humidity
above 50% followed by a decline[27]. These features of
Harper and Schaffer further support the Lowen 20°C data
for 50% RH, which was already of sufficient statistical sig-
nificance. Additionally, Schaffer supports the 65% RH
increase in transmission called out as statistically of
insufficient power by Lowen et al. A further argument in
favor of the 65% RH increase in transmission is care to
present conservative contagion contours where there is a
question; thus we retained the feature showing a rise in
contagion at 65% RH.
Consequently, although p values for Lowen et al. alone
are insufficient for acceptance of the 65% RH rise in con-
tagion, taking alternative data sources and conservatism
into account, we retained the 65% RH feature. We under-
stand that the details of the type of contour map we pres-
ent may change with larger datasets between 5°C and
30°C and we strongly encourage performance of larger
experiments with multiple strains of influenza and other
respiratory viruses. It would be highly desirable to have a
larger dataset on the order of 30 animals or more at each
temperature and RH setting and more temperature and
RH values.
25%G7 transmission risk contour selection
For visual inspection purposes the 25%G7 transmission
estimate contour is emphasized and became the refer-
ence using the following rationale.Hanley and Borup Virology Journal 2010, 7:98
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Since Lloyd-Smith et al. reported the SARS epidemic
was primarily propagated by superspreaders infecting 4
or more people[33], we chose conditions that should limit
spreading to infect 1 or 2 on average.
The guinea pig experiments of Lowen were performed
for 7 days. In most public places such as banks and hotel
lobbies with good conditions for transmission of influ-
enza, the time people spend is on the order of 10 minutes.
This corresponds by integration of equation 2 to a crude
risk of 1/1959 for any one entry and exit at the 25%G7 con-
tour. Thus, assuming 300 patrons per day yields approxi-
mately 1 case every 6 days for a usual branch, assuming
an infected individual is shedding virus continuously.
Risk on a bus ride of 8 hours at the 25%G7 contour yields a
crude risk of 1/41, which roughly corresponds to 1 new
infection per 8 hour bus ride assuming continuous virus
shedding. Assuming an influenza case of 7 days virus
shedding duration, we thought it improbable most locals
would take more than two 8 hour luxury bus rides with
50 passengers per bus in that time span (vendors
excluded) for a total of 2 new infections. (Table 1)
These crude risks represent the rationale of our risk
cutoff in enclosed spaces. However, we do not think one
contour cutoff is always appropriate.
Aircraft data interpretation
A considerable amount of data was collected for aircraft,
however, transmission risk on aircraft is complex. First,
the influenza contagion space relative to temperature and
RH on aircraft is mostly unknown since studies have not
been done below 20% RH, and large portions of flights
can occur with RH in the 3% to 15% range (Figure 10).
How such extremely low RH affects transmission is
unknown. Second, although influenza was communi-
cated well to aircraft passengers circa 1979 during a
ground delay (38 of 54 passengers in 4.5 hours, 1 index
case) given lack of air circulation[34], HEPA filtration of
recirculated cabin air on most aircraft today mitigates
this hazard, together with outside air exchange in flight.
Literature raises questions about efficacy of HEPA filters
on aircraft[35]; however, the careful epidemiology of
SARS on an aircraft[24] suggests HEPA filters and air
exchange were fairly effective on that aircraft because of
the apparent wake pattern of infection. That correlates
with modeling of wake particles carried behind persons
moving along the aisle[36]. SARS, like influenza, is an
enveloped RNA virus of the same size, which likely has
similar filtration characteristics. Third, on some aircraft,
ozone is negligible due to catalytic units[37]. Ozone
Table 1: Crude risk of contagion in vehicles or buildings
25%G7 transmission risk 
contour line
40%G7 transmission risk 
contour line
60%G7 transmission risk 
contour line
Per 
passenger 
or patron
Per vehicle 
or building
Per 
passenger 
or patron
Per vehicle 
or building
Per 
passenger 
or patron
Per vehicle 
or building
Luxury bus 4 hr 1/81 0.6 1/51 1 1/34 2
Luxury bus 8 hr 1/41 1 1/25 2 1/17 3
Luxury bus 12 hr 1/27 2 1/17 3 1/11 4
Taxi 20 min 1/989 1/495 1/618 1/309 1/412 1/206
Taxi 45 min 1/435 1/218 1/272 1/136 1/181 1/91
Tour car 2 hr 1/163 1/82 1/102 1/51 1/68 1/34
Tour car 5 hr 1/65 1/33 1/41 1/20 1/27 1/14
Bank branch 10 min 1/1959 1/109 1/1224 1/68 1/816 1/45
Crude risk of contagion for individuals in vehicle or building locations assuming presence of virus shedding. Estimates are calculated from 
equation 2 expressed as whole number fractions for selected transmission probability contours. For example, the per passenger risk on a 4 
hour luxury bus ride is 0.0123, or 1/81. Since buses are assumed to have 50 passengers, for conditions at the 25%G7 risk contour line, 50/81 = 
0.6. So for every two bus rides of 4 hours under these conditions, approximately 1 aerosol infection would be expected. Similarly, in 10 
minutes in a bank branch at the 25%G7 risk contour, assuming 18 people in the branch, there is a roughly 1 in 1959 chance of infection in any 
10 minute period. Assuming 300 patrons per day, there would be 1 infection per branch during a one week infectious cycle under standard 
conditions.
For quick, rough estimates in a public health setting, estimates such as these can be made by use of the table. These kinds of estimates were 
used to decide which was the reasonable aerosol transmission risk contour to use to demarcate the low risk boundary of the figure 1 graph. 
(See Discussion, 25%G7 transmission risk contour selection.) It should be noted that these numbers are useful as guidance rather than 
being completely predictive since other factors such as ventilation diluting virus aerosol, rate of exhalation of aerosol virus, direction of 
airflow, and wake effects will have major effects on actual infection numbers.Hanley and Borup Virology Journal 2010, 7:98
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would be expected to deactivate virions significantly[38],
but the extent this occurs at ozone levels of aircraft lack-
ing catalytic units is unknown. One must also weigh
ozone causing a possible increase in host susceptibility
and worse course of disease[39], another unknown. Con-
sequently, we believe risk, per our study criteria, to be low
on aircraft outside deplaning, but worth continued atten-
tion.
Alternative views on aerosol transmission of influenza
Examining literature questioning whether influenza is
transmitted by aerosol, it appears a major question is the
distance at which aerosol transmission of influenza
occurs, and we contend that such transmission varies
greatly with conditions. There is also a proposal that vita-
min D hormone is a regulator of seasonal influenza inci-
dence in the context of questions raised about influenza's
fundamental epidemiology[10].
Aerosol question - Han et al. example
In the example of Han et al.[9] the researchers state that
no aerosol transmission occurred because interview data
indicated that the 9 infected parties out of 31 tour group
members all either talked to or were coughed on directly
by the index case over a 3 day period. (Aircraft infections
in Han are left aside for the reasons discussed above.)
Noting that in a warm, humid environment contact
transmission would be the expected primary mode, a
guess can be hazarded in light of the current study.
What the temperature, relative humidity or ventilation
characteristics were for the indoor environments of this
tour group are not known with precision. A best guess of
aerosol expectation based on bus data for comparable
outdoor conditions in the current study derived a low of 1
infection (7 hours, 40%G7 risk) and a high of roughly 5 - 6
infections (7 hours, 100%G7 risk, poor ventilation roughly
doubling infections). (Better estimates would depend on
actual T and RH, ventilation and other factors.) Leaving
aside the reliability of interviews, the droplet (non-aero-
sol per Brankston et al.[8]) doses administered by talking
and coughing (presumably at close range) will drop off
quickly with distance due to conditions and dilution. And
depending on RH, those droplets may evaporate into
aerosol.
A few aerosol infections out of the 9 could easily be
missed by the Han methodology due to overlap (i.e. a per-
son who talked to the index case could be infected by
aerosol). Whether there is significance to there being 2 to
9 times the number of infections guessed depends on
more details than are available. Given the caveats, contact
could account for the majority of cases in this example as
could aerosol.
Aerosol question - Branktson et al. and Lemieux et al
The concerns of Lemieux et al.[7] and Brankston et al.[8]
as to whether aerosol influenza infection is significant
hinge on a number of matters. Primary among these is
what aerosol transmission means, as defined in the differ-
entiation of droplets ¥5 mm and aerosol §5 mm. We find
Tellier's response to Lemieux et al. compelling[40]. To it,
we add several notes.
We believe that influenza is transmitted both by con-
tact and by aerosol. The conversion of droplets ¥5 mm to
smaller size varies based on humidity and we reiterate
Tellier's point that studies have shown viable virus after
Table 2: Risk of transmission during deplaning
25%G7 transmission risk
 contour line
40%G7 transmission risk 
contour line
60%G7 transmission risk
 contour line
Per 
passenger
Per aircraft Per 
passenger
Per aircraft Per 
passenger
Per aircraft
Mean airplane
deplane period 5 min
Range: 2 to 13 min 1/3917 1/20 1/2448 1/12 1/1632 1/8
Shows risk of contagion during the deplaning period of a flight, assuming an infected passenger shedding virus, assuming 200 passengers 
per aircraft. During deplaning, 22 of 87 time intervals of 2 minutes were above the 25%G7 transmission risk contour, and 5 of 87 intervals were 
below the 60%G7 contour. Deplaning mean contour was approximately 40%G7. Moser[34] has a time period of 4.5 hours in an unventilated 
enclosed aircraft on March 14, 1977 in Homer, Alaska when the outdoor high was 0°C (outdoor RH ranged from 67% to 96%) while the aircraft 
sat on the runway with the ventilation off. In that incident, 39 of 54 passengers (72%) were reported ill from an index case. Using Equation 2 
with 100%G7 transmission risk, approximately 3 new infections would be expected, or roughly 10% of what was seen, which is a reasonable 
correlation given an enclosed space without ventilation and uncertainties about conditions. As others have noted, this confirms that factors 
such as ventilation have a strong impact on aerosol transmission[50]. Aerosol infectious virus load per unit of air would be expected to vary 
based on rate of input, rate of deactivation, and degree of dilution by ventilation. We think it is reasonable to include a multiplier on estimates 
where air exchange is poor and that 10× is a reasonable upper bound.Hanley and Borup Virology Journal 2010, 7:98
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hours suspended in air[25,27]. Tropical temperature and
humidity does not block transmission by contact, but
does block transmission by aerosol[17]. Since it has long
been observed that influenza epidemics are muted in the
tropics, and they die out in temperate summers, this
argues that aerosol transmission is necessary to sustain a
rise in R0 above 1 in large populations.
Vitamin D hypothesis
A number of studies have presented data showing an
inverse correlation between serum 25-hydroxyvitamin D
(25-hD) levels and upper respiratory tract infection
(URTI) and questions raised about influenza epidemiol-
ogy[10,41-43]. 25-hD level has been proposed as the sea-
sonal factor for influenza epidemics by correlating 25-hD
level inversely with influenza season. That these groups
maintained a differential year round is evidence in its
favor as a factor and 25-hD has been shown to positively
modulate mucosal immunity[44].
Notably though, summer URTI incidence is roughly
half of winter for all groups; also, the least protected
group (10 ng/ml of 25-hD) in summer had approximately
25% lower URTI incidence than the protected group (30
ng/ml of 25-hD) had in winter. Additionally, influenza
spikes can occur in October and November when 25-hD
levels are reported relatively high[45]. Thus, 25-hD is a
probable influence but whether it is sufficient in itself to
explain seasonality is at most an open question. Vitamin
A (present in cod liver oil with 25-hD for some studies)
may also be a significant factor since vitamin A shows a
strong influence on measles[46], which is another envel-
oped virus spread by aerosol. Such factors need contin-
ued study in order to include them properly in our
understanding and epidemiological models.
The present study presents a view of influenza epidemi-
o l o g y  t h a t  n e e d s  t o  b e  c a r e f u l l y  c o n s i d e r e d ,  a s  i t  c a n
potentially explain certain apparent anomalies of influ-
Figure 10 Time course plots of plane flight temperature and relative humidity. 10A and 10B show temperature and RH from the time of leaving 
the gate until the aircraft begins its descent to land. 10C and 10D show temperature and RH from the time of starting to descend for landing until 
passengers leave the plane (where zero is the start of descent toward landing). Influenza transmission risk evaluation is not attempted due to lack of 
transmission data in literature for most of the humidity levels, HEPA filtration and other factors. Graphs are provided for informational interest. (See 
Discussion, Aircraft data interpretation.) Aircraft N = 15.
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enza transmission such as aspects of superspreading and
unexpectedly low secondary attack rates[10].
Conclusions
Given the results of this survey and analysis of literature
data, we recommend the following to help mitigate the
spread of influenza in the broader context of recom-
mending that influenza epidemiological studies try to
account for and report temperature and RH data of
indoor enclosed locations to the extent this is practical.
Provide inexpensive tools to monitor environment
Digital psychrometers cost on the order of $100 to $160
in single quantities (larger purchases may be possible at
lower cost). Based on visualizing the data collected, steps
can be taken to attempt to either move higher risk envi-
ronments in the direction of lower aerosol transmission
risk, or else direct the use of other measures in those
environments. A chart (Figure 1) should be inexpensive
to distribute.
Educate luxury bus, taxicab, and hotel car operators
Luxury buses deserve special attention, as they cross bor-
ders and travelers spend upwards of 4 hours in the envi-
ronment. The close quarters of these vehicles'
recirculating air are a good opportunity for aerosol trans-
mission of influenza (and other respiratory diseases).
Vendors to luxury buses represent the potential to be
superspreaders of influenza, visiting many buses, speak-
ing and moving systematically through the bus for peri-
ods of time per bus from 2 to 45 minutes, spending totals
of hours per day in buses in multiple visits. Vendors also
have direct contacts with passengers, increasing their
chances of acquiring and then transmitting infection.
Superspreaders were important for the SARS epidemic,
showing an unexpected distribution of infectors[33] and
probably are for influenza. Bus companies distributing
masks and hand sanitizer to vendors to protect them may
yield benefits.
Focus on major hotels, shops, offices, dining, malls and 
bank branches
Public health can educate maintenance staff of luxury
hotels, newer malls (small and large), offices, dining
establishments, banks, and colleges about caring for their
environmental settings during a flu season. For those
locations that have a need to portray an image of higher
status, and hence comfort, how to balance that is a ques-
tion for HVAC engineers.
Influenza transmission on aircraft is probably fairly low
Based on our examination, we think that influenza trans-
mission on aircraft is probably a not a serious risk most of
the time, as discussed above, although the passenger
numbers are quite large. Most of the risk appears to be off
the aircraft, although wake effects can be troublesome,
and T and RH may regulate whether wake effects can
occur. Lacking viability data for the humidity range com-
mon on aircraft, how that works is clearly an open ques-
tion. However, since the period starting when passengers
stand up after landing to emptying the aircraft does fall
within our parameters and is quite short, it may be an
insignificant cost for airlines to flush cabin air from the
end of the runway after landing until passengers leave the
aircraft to further lower transmission risk on aircraft.
Public health relative to other disease and temperature 
vs. RH
Many viruses and bacteria will display viability conditions
opposite to influenza. Endemic disease threat such as M.
tuberculosis  should be weighed since TB is correlated
with tropical climates[47], suggesting its aerosol trans-
mission is optimum in high RH and warm temperature.
TB is a hardy organism that forms culturable aerosol
from coughing[48] but the aerobiology of transmission is
not well explored[47]. Guinea pig model TB transmission
studies in parallel with influenza exploring variations of
temperature and RH relative to HEPA filtration and ultra-
violet light as recommended by Nardell and Piessens[47]
would be desirable. The TB concern indicates that in TB
endemic regions humidity lower than 60% should be tar-
geted on the transmission contour map (Figure 1). There
are also commonalities between other measures that can
minimize influenza aerosol contagion and measures
against TB and other microbial aerosol (such as UV irra-
diation of upper air [49]).
Summary
Climate control for enclosed spaces should be added to
public health to control influenza epidemics. The range
between 20% and 80% RH covers most human habitation
outside of aircraft, and the region above 80% RH appears
to be a low transmission risk, although both these regions
should be explored. In the tropics, getting an indoor facil-
ity out of the region of highest risk should be simple and
low or no cost. In temperate regions, controlling AC to
stay out of the optimum transmission region may be
more challenging. At a minimum, the low or no cost step
of changing climate control parameters should not raise
the R0 (reproductive number) of an influenza epidemic
and will lower it considerably if seasonal influenza trans-
mission is any guide. The authors hope for further refine-
ment; however, this is an inexpensive starting point with
highly probable benefits, which should be a net savings
for nations. For those who perform epidemiological stud-
ies, analyzing data in light of temperature and relative
humidity will help our understanding of influenza epide-
miology.Hanley and Borup Virology Journal 2010, 7:98
http://www.virologyj.com/content/7/1/98
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List of abbreviations
25%G7: Contour corresponding to a 25% risk of transmis-
sion of influenza from one guinea pig to another over 7
days; 25-hD-25-hydroxyvitamin D; AC: Air conditioning;
C: Centigrade; HEPA: High efficiency particle absor-
bance; HVAC: Heating ventilating and air conditioning;
RH: Relative humidity; SARS: Severe acute respiratory
syndrome; T: Temperature; URTI: Upper respiratory tract
infection; UV: Ultraviolet light
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